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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In this Title VII retaliation action, Dr. Millicent 
Carvalho-Grevious appeals from an order of summary 
judgment granted in favor of her former employer, Delaware 
State University, and two of its employees, John Austin, then-
interim Dean of the College of Education, Health and Public 
Policy, and Alton Thompson, Provost and Vice President for 
Academic Affairs.  Dr. Grevious alleges that by retaliating 
against her for complaining about discriminatory employment 
 3 
 
practices based on race and gender, the University violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3, and that by retaliating against her for complaining about 
discriminatory employment practices based on race, Dean 
Austin and Provost Thompson violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  In 
this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff asserting a Title 
VII retaliation claim must establish but-for causation as part 
of her prima facie case pursuant to University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013).  We hold that, at the prima facie stage, a plaintiff need 
only proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her 
engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for 
the adverse employment action, not the but-for reason. 
With respect to Dr. Grevious’s contract revision claim 
against the University and Provost Thompson, we will reverse 
the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.  
We will affirm in all other respects. 
I 
The University hired Dr. Grevious as an associate 
professor and as chairperson of the Department of Social 
Work (the “Department”) in August 2010.1  Both terms of 
employment were contracted to end on June 30, 2011, but 
were subject to reappointment.  As chairperson, Dr. Grevious 
supervised nine employees and managed the Department.  
But her main focus was to facilitate the Department’s 
reaccreditation efforts, which included submitting a 
comprehensive self-study and other supporting 
documentation to the Office of Social Work Accreditation 
                                              
1 As a University employee, the general terms and 
conditions of Dr. Grevious’s employment were governed by a 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  J.A. 327-455. 
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(“OSWA”) by August 1, 2011.  Dr. Grevious reported to 
Dean Austin, who in turn reported to Provost Thompson.  
Provost Thompson was primarily responsible for the 
Department’s reaccreditation.  
From the beginning of Dr. Grevious’s employment, 
she struggled with the reaccreditation process, in part due to 
the Department being in “complete disarray,” and in part due 
to the faculty and staff’s lack of structure.  Grevious Br. 5.  
Dr. Grevious also experienced personal difficulties with the 
Department faculty and staff.  Within her first three months as 
chairperson, Dr. Grevious recommended the nonrenewal of 
two professors, the replacement of two of her administrative 
staff, and the termination of a Department consultant.  Three 
of those individuals submitted written complaints to Dean 
Austin describing Dr. Grevious’s actions as “unprofessional 
and unwarranted,” claiming to have been “degraded, belittled, 
and harassed,” J.A. 188-95, and subjected to “retribution” 
related to Dr. Grevious’s personal grudges,  J.A. 204-05.  
Although her relationships with junior faculty and staff were 
strained, two senior faculty members and some of her 
students submitted positive evaluations of her performance as 
part of the University’s formal evaluation process.  
The Department scheduled an election in February 
2011 to determine whether Dr. Grevious would be 
reappointed as chairperson for an additional term.  As the 
election approached, Dr. Grevious’s relationship with Dean 
Austin soured.  On January 20, 2011, Dr. Grevious requested 
a meeting with Provost Thompson to discuss, among other 
things, her frustrations with Dean Austin’s governance.  Dr. 
Grevious claimed that Dean Austin was hindering the 
reaccreditation process and campaigning against her 
reappointment as chairperson by soliciting junior faculty 
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members to vote against her.  She asked Provost Thompson to 
intervene.  J.A. 212-13. 
Dr. Grevious’s first complaint of discrimination and 
retaliation 
On January 27, having failed to resolve her issues with 
Dean Austin, Dr. Grevious emailed Provost Thompson 
regarding what she described as Dean Austin’s “unilateral 
and arbitrary management style” and, for the first time, to 
report that he allegedly made discriminatory comments.  J.A. 
231-33.  Dr. Grevious alleged that, when she confronted Dean 
Austin, he told her that his “management style was meant to 
stop ‘back biting among women, especially Black women,’ 
that is keep [sic] women from fighting amongst themselves to 
their own detriment.”  J.A. 232.  Dr. Grevious complained 
that she found Dean Austin “overtly sexist” and claimed that 
he reduced “interpersonal interaction between a department 
chair and her faculty and staff to race and gender issues, as a 
cover for making unilateral decisions.”  J.A. 232-33.   
On February 14, Provost Thompson spoke to Dean 
Austin, who denied making the alleged discriminatory 
comments.  The following day, Dean Austin formally 
evaluated Dr. Grevious as chairperson.  In the category 
addressing academic leadership and Department activities, 
Dean Austin rated Dr. Grevious a one out of five and 
commented that her “[l]eadership appears to be a major 
problem.”  J.A. 238.  Dr. Grevious contested the evaluation, 
and the next day Dean Austin submitted a revised, more-
favorable evaluation.  In the aforementioned category, Dean 
Austin upgraded Dr. Grevious’s rating from a one to a two 
out of five and commented that “[w]hile Chair indicates the 
activities she has accomplished in her academic development, 
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there is no clear indication where she is demonstrating 
leadership and development of faculty and staff.”  J.A. 241.   
In an email to Provost Thompson and the University’s 
general counsel, sent early on the morning of the Department 
election (February 16, 2011), Dr. Grevious argued that Dean 
Austin’s negative evaluation evidenced his retaliatory animus 
toward her for reporting his misconduct.  Dr. Grevious 
referenced the allegations raised in the January 27 email and 
requested that Provost Thompson insulate the election from 
Dean Austin’s interference.  Because Dr. Grevious was 
unable to produce evidence of Dean Austin’s interference, the 
election went forward as scheduled.  Including Dr. Grevious, 
the faculty voted five to four to appoint Dr. Marlene Saunders 
as the new Department Chair, effective June 30, 2011.2  
On March 1, 2011, in accordance with the CBA, Dr. 
Grevious filed a grievance with the Office of the Provost 
alleging that Dean Austin sexually harassed her and that, 
when she reported Dean Austin’s harassment to the Provost, 
Dean Austin retaliated by submitting a negative performance 
evaluation.  J.A. 249-62.  Responding to the grievance on 
behalf of the University, Provost Thompson stated that further 
action was unnecessary because investigations into Dr. 
Grevious’s claims did not yield evidence of CBA violations.  
J.A. 266.   
The University issues Dr. Grevious a renewable contract 
On April 1, 2011, based on Provost Thompson’s 
recommendation, the University tendered to Dr. Grevious a 
renewable contract as an associate professor for the 2011-
2012 academic year.  J.A. 269.  Around the same time, 
                                              
2 Dean Austin oversaw the election but, pursuant to the 
CBA’s procedures, did not vote.  See J.A. 441.  
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Provost Thompson learned that, under Dr. Grevious, the 
Department’s progress toward reaccreditation was 
significantly behind schedule.  Provost Thompson requested a 
one-year postponement of the reaccreditation deadline, citing 
the transition to a new chairperson as his justification.  J.A. 
279.  On April 14, OSWA denied the request.  That same day, 
Dr. Grevious filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment, 
racial discrimination, and related retaliation against Dean 
Austin with the University’s human resources department 
(“HR”).  J.A. 271-78.   
The University prematurely terminates Dr. Grevious’s term 
as chairperson 
On May 3, 2011, Dr. Grevious met with the vice 
president of HR to discuss her complaint.3  Later that day, the 
University informed Dr. Grevious that she would be 
dismissed as chairperson on May 6, but that she would 
continue to receive the chairperson salary through the natural 
expiration of her contract term.  J.A. 280.  In response, on 
May 20, Dr. Grevious filed an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge of discrimination 
claiming that the premature termination of her term as 
chairperson was unlawful retaliation for her complaints about 
Dean Austin’s sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and 
related retaliation.  J.A. 282-83.  Dean Austin, Provost 
Thompson, and the University became aware of the EEOC 
charge sometime in early June.  J.A. 177.  
The University issues Dr. Grevious a revised terminal 
contract 
                                              
3 Ultimately, the investigation was closed due to a lack 
of corroborating evidence. 
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On June 21, 2011, based again on Provost Thompson’s 
recommendation, the University revoked Dr. Grevious’s 
April 1 renewable contract and issued her a terminal contract 
ending her employment effective May 25, 2012.  J.A. 284.  
Dr. Grevious claims that on August 2, at a meeting to discuss 
the issuance of the terminal contract, Provost Thompson 
admitted that his recommendation was based on Dr. 
Grevious’s filing of the May 20 EEOC charge and that the 
ultimate decision was unrelated to her teaching or 
professional performance.  J.A. 290, 307.  Dr. Grevious 
thereafter filed a second EEOC charge alleging that she was 
issued a terminal contract in retaliation for having filed the 
initial EEOC charge.  J.A. 295. Provost Thompson denies 
making such admissions at the August meeting and claims 
that the decision was based on Dr. Grevious’s documented 
interpersonal conflict at the University. 
The following year, on June 22, 2012, when the 
terminal contract expired, Provost Thompson recommended 
that the University not reappoint Dr. Grevious for the 2012-
2013 academic year because of her consistent “inability to 
work collegially” with her colleagues.  J.A. 297.  Dr. 
Grevious subsequently filed a final EEOC charge alleging 
that her ultimate termination was retaliation for filing the 
earlier EEOC charges.  J.A. 317.  
After exhausting her administrative remedies, Dr. 
Grevious filed this suit in the District Court for the District of 
Delaware alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3, against the University, and retaliation in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Dean Austin and 
Provost Thompson (collectively “the Defendants”).  The 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that 
Dr. Grevious failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect 
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to the third element of her prima facie case—causation.  In 
granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court relied primarily on University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013), which held that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII 
retaliation claim must prove that the employer’s unlawful 
retaliation was the but-for cause of the adverse employment 
action, see Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., No. 
13-1386, 2015 WL 5768940, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2015).  
The District Court concluded that no reasonable jury could 
find that, but for Dr. Grevious’s complaints about harassment 
and discrimination, she would have been retained as 
chairperson or kept her renewable contract.  Therefore, it held 
that Dr. Grevious did not establish the causation element of 
her prima facie case.  See id. at *5.  The District Court also 
concluded that Dr. Grevious failed to establish that Provost 
Thompson’s non-retaliatory explanation for the issuance of a 
terminal contract was a pretext for discrimination.  Id.  Dr. 
Grevious filed this timely appeal. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting 
summary judgment and apply the same standard the district 
court applied.  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 
192 (3d Cir. 2015).  We will affirm if, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a)).    
III 
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Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating 
based on an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and from retaliating against 
an employee for complaining about, or reporting, 
discrimination or retaliation, id. § 2000e-3(a).  “The 
substantive elements of a [racial discrimination] claim under 
§ 1981 are generally identical to the elements of an 
employment discrimination claim under Title VII.”  Brown v. 
J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009).  We will 
therefore address these claims together.  See, e.g., Schurr v. 
Roserts Int’l Hotel Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Title VII and § 1981, however, are not coextensive, and to the 
extent that any of Dr. Grevious’s retaliation claims against 
either Provost Thompson or Dean Austin are based on Dr. 
Grevious’s complaints of gender discrimination, those claims 
are not cognizable.  See Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 
F.3d 73, 98 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of § 1981 
gender discrimination claim on the basis that § 1981, “on its 
face, is limited to issues of racial discrimination”).  
To state a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff 
must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she 
suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a 
causal connection between the participation in the protected 
activity and the adverse action.  Moore v. City of 
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006).  A 
plaintiff seeking to prove her case through indirect evidence, 
as Dr. Grevious seeks to here, may do so by applying the 
familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 
Daniels, 776 F.3d at 198-99.  After establishing a prima facie 
case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to 
provide a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its conduct.  
Moore, 461 F.3d at 342.  If it does so, the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff “to convince the factfinder both that the 
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employer’s proffered explanation was false [that is, a pretext], 
and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse 
employment action.”  Id.  The onus is on the plaintiff to 
establish causation at two stages of the case: initially, to 
demonstrate a causal connection as part of the prima facie 
case, and at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to satisfy her ultimate burden of persuasion by 
proving pretext. 
The question before us is what a plaintiff must bring as 
part of her prima facie case of retaliation to survive a motion 
for summary judgment in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nassar, which held that “Title VII retaliation 
claims must be proven according to traditional principles of 
but-for causation.”  133 S. Ct. at 2533.  Our sister circuits are 
split on this question.  See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 
787 F.3d 243, 251 n.10 (4th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).  We 
conclude that Nassar does not alter the plaintiff’s burden at 
the prima facie stage; proving but-for causation as part of her 
ultimate burden of persuasion comes later, and not at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage.   
Importantly, the “but-for” causation standard required 
by Nassar “does not conflict with our continued application 
of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm” in Title VII retaliation 
cases.  Smith v. Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(analyzing Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 
(2009), and the “but-for” causation requirement in proving 
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).  
Applying McDonnell Douglas to Title VII retaliation claims, 
we have made clear that “[a]lthough the burden of production 
of evidence shifts back and forth, the plaintiff has the ultimate 
burden of persuasion at all times.”  Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193.  
Because the McDonnell Douglas framework affects the 
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burden of production but not the standard of causation that 
the plaintiff must prove as part of her ultimate burden of 
persuasion, Nassar “does not forbid our adherence to 
precedent applying McDonnell Douglas.”  Smith, 589 F.3d at 
691.  
A 
 A plaintiff asserting a claim of retaliation has a higher 
causal burden than a plaintiff asserting a claim of direct 
status-based discrimination under Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e–2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”) (emphasis added); Woodson v. 
Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 932-35 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s addition of § 
2000e–2(m)’s “motivating-factor” standard of causation does 
not apply to Title VII retaliation claims).  In Woodson, we 
held that a plaintiff must prove that retaliatory animus had a 
“determinative effect” on the employer’s decision to subject 
the employee to the adverse employment action.  109 F. 3d at 
932.  And in Moore, we stated the plaintiff’s causal burden 
slightly differently, holding that a plaintiff proceeding under a 
pretext theory, as Dr. Grevious seeks to here, must convince 
the factfinder that the employer’s proffered non-retaliatory 
explanation was false, and that retaliatory animus was the 
“real reason for the adverse employment action.” 461 F.3d at 
342 (emphasis added). 
More recently, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
retaliation plaintiff’s ultimate burden is to prove that 
retaliatory animus was the “but-for” cause of the adverse 
employment action.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2521.  As we did in 
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Woodson, the Nassar Court limited § 2000e–2(m)’s 
“motivating-factor” standard to status-based discrimination 
claims.  The Supreme Court reasoned that the plain text of § 
2000e–2(m)—which is notably silent as to retaliation 
claims—and the detailed statutory structure of Title VII, 
indicate that Congress did not intend to extend the 
“motivating-factor” standard to retaliation claims, which 
come under § 2000e–3(a).  Id. at 2528-30; see also Woodson, 
109 F.3d at 933-36.  
Although this Court’s “determinative effect” or “real 
reason” causation standard and the Supreme Court’s “but-for” 
causation standard differ in terminology, they are functionally 
the same.  To prove a “determinative effect,” the plaintiff 
must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a 
‘but-for’ causal connection” between the adverse employment 
action and retaliatory animus.  Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 
F.3d 586 586, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hazen Paper 
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).4  Similarly, a 
plaintiff who proves that retaliatory animus was the “real 
reason” for the adverse employment action will necessarily be 
able “to show that the harm would not have occurred in the 
absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.”  
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Regardless of any articulable differences, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that “Title VII retaliation claims must be 
                                              
4 The Nassar Court even cited Hazen Paper’s 
“determinative influence” standard as an example of the 
requirement of “[c]ausation in fact—i.e., proof that the 
defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury.”  
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524-26 (citing Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 
at 610). 
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proved according to traditional principles of but-for 
causation.”  Id. at 2533.  
Understanding the retaliation plaintiff’s ultimate 
burden, we turn to the question of whether that burden differs 
at the prima facie stage of the case.  We hold that it does.  See 
Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“In assessing causation, we are mindful of the 
procedural posture of the case.”); see also Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
relative evidentiary impact of [causal evidence] may vary 
depending upon the stage of the McDonnell Douglas proof 
analysis and the procedural circumstance,” i.e., if proffered to 
satisfy a plaintiff’s prima facie case for the purpose of 
summary judgment or if proffered to reverse a verdict).  
Consistent with our precedent, a plaintiff alleging retaliation 
has a lesser causal burden at the prima facie stage.  See e.g., 
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he prima facie requirement for making a Title VII 
claim ‘is not onerous’ and poses ‘a burden easily met.’” 
(quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253 (1981))). 
Some circuits have found, albeit without much in the 
way of explanation, that a plaintiff must prove but-for 
causation as part of the prima facie case of retaliation.  See 
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 770 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc); Ward v. Jewell, 772 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 
2014).  We decline now to heighten the plaintiff’s prima facie 
burden to meet her ultimate burden of persuasion.  That is 
because we agree with the Fourth Circuit that to do so  
would be tantamount to eliminating the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in 
retaliation cases . . . .  If plaintiffs can 
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prove but-for causation at the prima facie 
stage, they will necessarily be able to 
satisfy their ultimate burden of 
persuasion without proceeding through 
the pretext analysis.  Had the Nassar 
Court intended to retire McDonnell 
Douglas and set aside 40 years of 
precedent, it would have spoken plainly 
and clearly to that effect. 
Foster, 787 F.3d at 251.  We conclude that at the prima facie 
stage the plaintiff must produce evidence “sufficient to raise 
the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason 
for the adverse [employment] action.”  Kachmar v. SunGard 
Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
And finally, although the Nassar Court did express 
concern that a lesser causation standard could contribute to 
the filing of frivolous claims, see Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-
32, we do not believe that our holding today will lead to that 
result.  We are confident that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11’s certification requirements will deter an attorney from 
filing a frivolous claim of retaliation when his client is 
patently unable to meet her ultimate causal burden.  See 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) 
(holding that the purpose of Rule 11 “is to deter baseless 
filings in district court”).  
B 
We now turn to Dr. Grevious’s claims of unlawful 
retaliation.  In dispute is whether Dr. Grevious produced 
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that her engagement in a protected activity was the likely 
reason for the adverse employment action at the prima facie 
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first stage and that the Defendants’ explanation (at stage two) 
was pretext (at stage three).5 
“[A] plaintiff may rely on ‘a broad array of evidence’ 
to demonstrate the causal link between [the] protected activity 
and the adverse [employment] action taken.”  Marra, 497 
F.3d at 302 (quoting Farrell, 206 F.3d at 284).  She can meet 
this burden by proffering evidence of an employer’s 
inconsistent explanation for taking an adverse employment 
action, Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 
(3d Cir. 1986), a pattern of antagonism, Woodson, 109 F.3d at 
921, or temporal proximity “unusually suggestive of 
retaliatory motive,” Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 505 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “These are not 
the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered 
evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the 
inference.”  Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177. 
Dr. Grevious’s chairperson claim 
The District Court erred in applying Nassar and 
concluding that Dr. Grevious needed to establish but-for 
causation as part of her prima facie case.  Still, because we 
conclude that no reasonable juror could find that Dr. Grevious 
raised sufficiently the inference of retaliatory animus needed 
at the prima facie stage, we will affirm the District Court’s 
                                              
5 The parties do not dispute that Dr. Grevious engaged 
in protected activities when she complained, both formally 
and informally, about sexual harassment, gender and racial 
discrimination, and related retaliation, to the Provost’s Office, 
HR, and the EEOC.  The parties similarly do not dispute that 
the University’s premature termination of Dr. Grevious’s 
term as chairperson, or its unilateral issuance of a revised 
terminal contract, constitute adverse employment actions. 
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summary judgment of her chairperson claim.6  See Bernitsky 
v United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is 
well established that we are free to affirm the judgment of the 
district court on any basis which finds support in the record”). 
As chairperson, Dr. Grevious served at the pleasure of 
the Dean.  On April 14, 2011, Dr. Grevious submitted a 
formal HR complaint against Dean Austin.  On May 3, the 
same day that she met with HR to discuss the complaint, Dr. 
Grevious received notice that her term as chairperson would 
end prematurely on May 6.  Dr. Grevious argues that the 
temporal proximity between the HR meeting and the 
termination notice is unusually suggestive of retaliatory 
motive.  We disagree.   
First, Dr. Grevious’s April 14 HR complaint was 
exhaustive as to her claims against Dean Austin.  Dr. 
Grevious does not allege that during the May 3 meeting she 
brought additional claims of discrimination or retaliation, or 
that she introduced new evidence in support of her pre-
existing claims.  Nothing changed between April 14 and May 
3.  We are not persuaded that her same-day notification about 
the termination of her chairperson term is “unusually 
suggestive” of retaliatory motive. 
Second, we have emphasized that “temporal proximity 
merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference 
[of causation] can be drawn.  The element of causation, which 
                                              
6 Chief Judge Smith would also affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on Dr. Grevious’s 
chairperson claim.  In his view, however, Dr. Grevious 
established a prima facie case of retaliation, but failed to 
demonstrate that the University’s action was a pretext for 
retaliation. 
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necessarily involves an inquiry into the motives of an 
employer, is highly context-specific.”  Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 
178.  It is undisputed that under Dr. Grevious’s leadership the 
Department was not making sufficient progress toward 
achieving reaccreditation.  Provost Thompson twice lobbied 
OSWA for a one-year postponement of the August 1 
deadline.  On April 14, 2011, OSWA denied Provost 
Thompson’s second request.  J.A. 279.  Given Dr. Grevious’s 
difficulties and the impending reaccreditation deadline, the 
University instituted the early transition to Dr. Saunders’ 
term.  Despite the early transition, Dr. Grevious continued to 
receive the chairperson salary through the end of her contract 
term.  Consistent with the District Court’s assessment, we 
conclude that Dr. Grevious has failed to produce evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that her 
engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for 
the University’s premature termination of her chairperson 
term.  Even if Dr. Grevious could establish the element of 
causation, her claim would necessarily fail because she has 
not cast any doubt on the University’s decision to refocus the 
reaccreditation efforts in the limited amount of time that 
remained.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
summary judgment of Dr. Grevious’s chairperson claim. 
Dr. Grevious’s contract revision claim 
 Dr. Grevious’s contract revision claim presents a 
closer question.  Her appointment as assistant professor was 
probationary and contracted on a year-to-year basis.  J.A. 353.  
On April 1, 2011, despite her record of interpersonal conflict 
in the Department, Dr. Grevious received and accepted a 
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renewable contract.7  On May 20, Dr. Grevious filed an 
EEOC charge alleging that the premature termination of her 
term as chairperson was unlawful retaliation for her 
engagement in a protected activity.  Although the exact date 
is unclear, the parties agree that the Defendants learned about 
Dr. Grevious’s May 20 EEOC charge in early June.  On June 
21 the University issued Dr. Grevious a revised terminal 
contract.  The parties dispute whether, on its own, the 
temporal proximity between Dr. Grevious’s protected activity 
and the issuance of the revised terminal contract suffices to 
raise the inference of causation.8  We need not answer this 
question, because we find on the record before us that Dr. 
Grevious has produced sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could find the requisite inference of 
causation.  
                                              
7 The CBA mandates that the University “shall 
normally notify” employees of the terms and conditions of 
their employment for the following year on or by April 1.  
J.A. 345. 
8 The Defendants argue that to determine temporal 
proximity we should look to the date of Dr. Grevious’s first 
complaint, January 27, 2011, and not to the Defendants’ 
receipt of notice of the EEOC charge.  Defendants’ Br. 25.  If 
we look to the date of the first complaint, the intervening 
period would be five months.  If we look to the date of notice, 
the intervening period would be three weeks at most.  We 
have held that, on its own, an intervening temporal period of 
two days may raise the inference of causation but that a 
period of two months cannot.  See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 
F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989); William v. Phila. Hous. Auth. 
Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 759-60 (3d Cir. 2004).   
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  It is undisputed that there “was a continuous flow of 
complaints from department faculty and staff . . . .  They 
began immediately upon [Dr. Grevious’s] hire and remained 
consistent in the months that followed.”  Defendants’ Br. 28.  
Still, after reviewing the faculty, Dean, and students’ 
evaluations, Provost Thompson recommended issuance of a 
renewable contract.  J.A. 174.  Nothing in the record indicates 
that, between April 1 and June 21, anything changed with 
respect to Dr. Grevious’s professional performance other than 
her escalation from filing intra-University complaints to filing 
an EEOC charge. 
Additionally, in her amended complaint Dr. Grevious 
alleged that, at their August 2, 2011 meeting, Provost 
Thompson told her he recommended issuance of a terminal 
contract because Dr. Grevious “was the cause of trouble in 
the department (which was only in reference to [Dr. 
Grevious’s] complaints and protected activity)” and that the 
decision had nothing to do with her performance.  Am. 
Compl. ¶ 28, J.A. 307.  As part of her unsworn second EEOC 
charge, Dr. Grevious claimed that at the August meeting, 
Provost Thompson admitted that the decision was made in 
“retaliation for filing the EEOC complaint.”  J.A. 290.  The 
District Court discounted Dr. Grevious’s claim as an 
“uncorroborated statement.”  2015 WL 5768940, at *5.  This 
was error.  Credibility determinations are for the factfinder 
and are inappropriate at the summary judgment stage.  See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).  
What makes the District Court’s reasoning more problematic 
is that it also relied on a “contemporaneous” memo offered by 
Defendants to show a non-retaliatory explanation for their 
decision.  2015 WL 5768940, at *5.  The “contemporaneous” 
memo, however, is dated June 22, 2012, one year after the 
issuance of the revised terminal contract.  J.A. 145.  We 
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conclude that, given the absence of a meaningful change in 
Dr. Grevious’s professional performance in the Spring of 
2011 and Provost Thompsons’s alleged admission, a 
reasonable factfinder could infer that Dr. Grevious’s 
engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for 
the issuance of the revised terminal contract.  
The pretext stage of Dr. Grevious’s contract revision claim 
We now turn to the pretext stage of the analysis.  We 
rely largely on the evidence produced in support of Dr. 
Grevious’s prima facie case, recognizing that “nothing about 
the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the 
evidence between one stage or the other.”  Farrell, 206 F.3d 
at 286.  At this point, the burden is on the Defendants to 
articulate a legitimate reason for issuing the revised terminal 
contract.  Importantly, the Defendants’ burden is one of 
production, not of persuasion.  See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193 
(“the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion at all 
times”).  The Defendants met this burden by producing 
evidence that the April 1 contract was not final and that 
issuance of the terminal contract was based on Dr. Grevious’s 
inability to work collegially in the Department.  See 
Defendants’ Br. 27. 
The burden therefore shifts back to Dr. Grevious to 
demonstrate “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions” from which a reasonable 
juror could conclude that the Defendants’ explanation is 
“unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did 
not act for the asserted [non-retaliatory] reasons.”  Daniels, 
776 F.3d at 199 (brackets omitted) (quoting Ross v. Gilhuly, 
755 F.3d 185, 194 n.13 (3d Cir. 2014)).  Ultimately, the 
remaining issue is unlawful retaliation vel non.  See Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 
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To prevail at trial, Dr. Grevious need not prove that, 
had she not filed the May 20 EEOC charge, the University 
never would have issued her a terminal contract.  She only 
needs to convince the factfinder that, had she not filed that 
charge, the University would not have issued the terminal 
contract on June 21, 2011.  Her inability to work collegially 
in the Department existed long before, including when both 
the renewable and the revised terminal contracts were issued.  
Typically, before issuing a terminal contract, the University 
put the at-risk faculty member on a professional improvement 
plan designed to meet the discrepancies and deficiencies 
identified in the faculty member’s evaluations.  J.A. 114.  
Even in the absence of a plan, the faculty member generally 
had the right to meet with the appropriate vice president 
before the ultimate recommendation to issue a terminal 
contract was submitted to the president of the University.  
J.A. 386.  A reasonable factfinder could determine that the 
University’s failure to extend to Dr. Grevious either of these 
opportunities and her long-existing difficulty in the 
Department indicate weaknesses in the Defendants’ 
explanation and suggest pretext.  If found to be credible, 
Provost Thompson’s admission of retaliatory animus only 
strengthens Dr. Grevious’s case.  Thus we conclude that Dr. 
Grevious has raised “a factual issue regarding the employer’s 
true motivation” for the revision of her contract, and as such, 
her claims against the University and Provost Thompson 
withstand summary judgment.  Jalil, 873 F.2d at 707. 
Dr. Grevious’s remaining claims against Dean Austin 
We will, however, affirm the District Court’s summary 
judgment of all of Dr. Grevious’s claims against Dean Austin.  
The parties do not dispute that Provost Thompson, not Dean 
Austin, was responsible for recommending issuance of the 
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terminal contract.  Dr. Grevious alleges that Dean Austin’s 
retaliatory adverse employment action was the filing of a 
negative evaluation.  But Dr. Grevious has not introduced 
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that 
Dean Austin’s negative evaluation was likely retaliation 
against Dr. Grevious for engaging in a protected activity.  Dr. 
Grevious complained about Dean Austin’s efforts to 
undermine her effectiveness as chairperson as early as 
January 20, 2011, before she first alleged harassment or 
discrimination.  Even if Dean Austin’s conduct was motivated 
by animus, it predated her engagement in protected activities.  
Moreover, although Provost Thompson may have considered 
Dean Austin’s evaluation of Dr. Grevious, it is not clear that 
Dean Austin had any meaningful bearing on the ultimate 
decision to issue the terminal contract.  As such, Dr. Grevious 
has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find the requisite causal connection between her 
protected activity and Dean Austin’s alleged retaliatory 
adverse employment action.  
* * * 
Accordingly, we will affirm on Dr. Grevious’s contract 
revision claim against Dean Austin, reverse on Dr. Grevious’s 
contract revision claim against the University and against 
Provost Thompson, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
